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Abstract 
This paper reanalyses data used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010c - RR), and later Herndon et 
al. (2013) to consider the relationship between growth and debt in developed countries.  The 
consistency over countries and the causal direction of RR¶V VR FDOOHG µstylised fact¶ is 
considered.  Using multilevel models, we find that when the effect of debt on growth is 
allowed to vary, and linear time trends are fully controlled for, the average effect of debt on 
growth disappears, whilst country-specific debt relations vary significantly.  Additionally, 
countries with high debt levels debt appear more volatile in their growth rates.  Regarding 
causality, we develop a new method extending distributed lag models to multilevel situations.  
These models suggest the causal direction is predominantly growth-to-debt, and is consistent 
(with some exceptions) across countries.  We argue that 55¶VILQGLQJV are too simplistic, with 
limited policy relevance, whilst demonstrating how multilevel models can explicate 
realistically complex scenarios. 
 
Keywords: Public Debt, Economic Growth, Multilevel Modelling, Reverse Causality 
JEL codes: E60, C23, H63 
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Introduction 
$UHFHQWSDSHUE\ WZR$PHULFDQHFRQRPLVWV RQ µ*URZWK LQD WLPHRIGHEW¶ ± an in-house 
working paper (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010a) and an abbreviated version published in the 
annual conference Papers and Proceedings volume of the American Economic Review 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010c)  ± has attracted much comment since its publication. Its subject 
ZDV WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ D FRXQWU\¶V GHEW UHODWLYH WR *DP) and the associated annual 
rate of real GDP growth. Its conclusions appeared to offer strong support for the austerity 
budgets being pursued by a number of countries following the credit crash and banking crisis 
of 2008 (on which see Lysandrou, 2013, Rogoff and Reinhart, 2013). 
The first set of comments reflected the important substantive and policy implications of their 
findings, especially those based on a dataset applying to 20 OECD countries for the period 
1947-2009. Their core conclusion (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010c, 573) was that: 
«ZKHUHDVWKHOLQNEHWZHHQJURZWKDQGGHEWVHHPVUHODWLYHO\ZHDNDW³QRUPDO´GHEW
levels, median growth rates for countries with public debt over roughly 90 percent of 
GDP are about one percent lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are 
several percent lower. [In this, a reduction of one percent should be interpreted as a 
reduction of one percentage point.] 
This was considerHG µWLPHO\¶ JLYHQ WKDW µ3XEOLF GHEW KDV EHHQ VRDULQJ LQ WKH ZDNH RI WKH
recent global finanFLDOPDHOVWURP¶,WZDVLQWHUSUHWHG± by journalists and other commentators 
QR GRXEW IROORZLQJ WKH DXWKRUV¶ OHDG DQG WKHQ E\ SROLF\ DQDO\VWV ± as suggesting the 
H[LVWHQFHRIDµGHEWEXUGHQFOLII¶RQFHWKHUDWLRRIGHEWWR*'3H[FHHGHGSHUFHQWWKHQa 
FRXQWU\¶V UDWH RI JURZWK IHOO RII VXEVWDQWLDOO\ $t that time, austerity budgets were being 
promoted in the UK and other European countries, and politicians seized on Reinhart and 
5RJRII¶VFRQFOXVLRQWRVXVWDLQarguments that theLUFRXQWU\¶V debt:GDP ratio should be kept 
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below that key threshold in order to ensure substantial economic growth to lift the country 
out of recession.  Indeed the draft budget drawn up for the United States by Representative 
3DXO 5\DQ ODWHU 0LWW 5RPQH\¶V UXQQLQJ-mate in the 2012 US Presidential election) was 
similarly EDVHGRQWKDWµVW\OL]HGIDFW¶(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010b, 1). 
The second set of comments was initiated in spring 2013 with the publication of a working 
paper from the Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts-
Amherst (Herndon, et al., 2013). As a graduate student, Herndon undertook an assignment to 
repeat the analyses of a key paper ± LQKLVFDVH5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶V± and found that he 
could not replicate their findings with the dataset used in the publications referred to above. 
In particular ± after exhaustive analyses and re-analyses ± it appeared that there was no 
HYLGHQFHRIDµGHEWEXUGHQFOLII¶WKHUDWHRIJURZWKGHFOLQHGDVWKHGHEW*'3UDWLRLQFUHDVHG 
(as shown in Figure 1, which replicates Figure 1 in the Herndon et al. paper), but there was 
no significant change in the relationship at or close to the supposed 90 per cent threshold (or 
indeed any other). The linear regression line shown in Figure 1 is very shallow, and the 
addition of quadratic and cubic terms provided no evidence of a significant downturn for the 
fourth group. 
[Fig. 1 about here] 
7KLVFRQFOXVLRQUHIOHFWHGWKUHHFULWLFLVHGHOHPHQWVRI5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶VZRUN 
x The exclusion of data for certain years in three countries, which included several of 
the key years there when the debt:GDP ratio exceeded 90; 
x The exclusion of all data for five countries at the top of the alphabet due to a 
spreadsheet error; and 
x Some weakly-justified averaging-cum-weighting decisions that substantially affected 
the outcome. 
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Correcting for the errors and exclusions, and removing the weighting and averaging 
procedures, Herndon et al. (2013, 1) concluded that: 
 «ZKHQSURSHUO\FDOFXODWHG WKHDYHUDJH UHDO*'3JURZWKIRUFRXQWULHVFDUU\LQg a 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90 percent is actually 2.2 percent, not -0.1 percent as 
published by Reinhart and Rogoff. That is, contrary to RR, average GDP growth at 
public debt/GDP ratios over 90 percent is not dramatically different than when 
debt/GDP ratios are lower. 
TKHSROLF\SUHVFULSWLRQEDVHGRQ5HLQKDUW DQG 5RJRII¶V DQDO\VHVZDV thereby undermined: 
there was no empirical rationale for maintaining that the debt:GDP ratio should not be 
allowed to exceed 90 per cent. 
+HUQGRQ HW DO¶V FDUHIXO failed) attempt to replicate Reinhart anG 5RJRII¶V DQDO\VHV
unsurprisingly had a very substantial impact on economic commentators, who drew potential 
implications for future policy directions in those slow-growing countries where austerity 
budgets had been promoted politically as the necessary way forward. Alternative policies 
based on greater investment in growth stimuli, even if they took the debt:GDP ratio over 90, 
had been dismissed by those politically-committed to austerity budgets: the veracity of their 
arguments was now in doubt. (Indeed, at least one commentator (Linden, 2013, 2) has 
VXJJHVWHG WKDW µ7KH NH\ DUJXPHQW WKDW KLJK GHEW FDXVHV VORZHU JURZWK KDV FUXPEOHG¶ DQG
µ&RXQWULHVDURXQG WKHZRUOGKDYHH[SHULPHQWHGZLWKDXVWHULW\DQG WKRVHH[SHULPHQts have 
IDLOHGVSHFWDFXODUO\¶ 
The paper does, moreover, fit into a wider literature considering the macroeconomic 
relationship between growth and debt, the conclusions of which are somewhat mixed (for a 
more comprehensive review of this debate, see Panizza and Presbitero, 2013).  A 
³FRQYHQWLRQDOYLHZ´ VHSDUDWHs out the long and short term effects of debt, with debt being 
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beneficial in the short term but in the long run leading to declines in national savings because 
of future repayments (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999).  This could be exaggerated if debt 
leads to uncertainty among investors fearing default (Cochrane, 2011a, 2011b), or if debt-
overhang (Krugman, 1988) means that countries have difficulty borrowing further. However, 
it is also argued by some that, because of the negative effects of prolonged recession on 
future economic performance, borrowing money to stimulate growth can often be worthwhile 
(Cerra and Saxene, 2008, DeLong and Summers, 2012).  The idea of finding a balance 
between the two, and thXVWKHUHEHLQJDQµRSWLPDO¶OHYHORIGHEW, provides a theoretical basis 
for non-linearities, where the growth-debt relationship is hump-shaped (Checherita-Westphal 
et al., 2012).  However, empirically, both the presence and shape of any relationship is 
dependent on the specification of the model and the statistical method being used ± certainly 
the pro-austerity message taken by many from Reinhart and Rogoff (2010c) has been 
overstated. 
The Herndon et al. paper carried two important messages for social scientists seeking to 
influence policy through their empirical analyses. The first ± very clearly ± was to be sure 
that your data are correct and any manipulations fully justified. This has been widely trawled 
in the media and through social networks, and is not the subject of further discussion here. 
The second message is highlighted by another of their conclusions, which has attracted much 
OHVVDWWHQWLRQEHFDXVHWKHLUPDLQJRDOZDVWRVKRZWKDW5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶VILQGLQJVFRXOG
not be replicated, using their methodology but with corrected data. Herndon et al. also found 
that µ« WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSXEOLFGHEW DQG*'3 JURZWKYDULHV VLJQLILFDQWO\E\ WLPH
period and country¶ (p.1): in other words, there was no µVW\OL]HG IDFW¶ (Kaldor, 1961) ± no 
general rHODWLRQVKLSDFURVVWLPHDQGVSDFHIURPZKLFKµXQLYHUVDO¶SROLF\FRQFOXVLRQVFRXOG
be drawn.  
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7KLVSDSHUKDVWZRPDLQJRDOV7KHILUVWLVWRHYDOXDWHWKHYHUDFLW\RI5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶V
µVW\OLVHGIDFW¶DVDFUHGLEOHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI WKHGHEW-growth relationship across a range of 
countries ± and thus as valuable evidence for economic policy formulation. Rather than 
assume that a single conclusion fits all countries, we use multilevel modelling to explore 
whether the relationship between those two economic indicators varies in its direction and 
intensity across the sampled countries ± LQWKDWZD\LQWURGXFLQJWKHµVLWXDWHGPHVVLQHVV¶WKDW
can reflect inter-country variations in the economic context within which the relationship 
between debt and growth is determined. We also explore whether the causal direction is the 
same ± higher debt inhibiting growth ± across all countries, or whether local circumstances is 
some generates a reverse causal link (if any). Should we accept the null hypothesis of no 
geographicDOYDULDWLRQ WKHQ WKH µVW\OLVHG IDFW¶ LV DYDOLGJHQHUDOFRQFOXVLRQDQG IRXQGDWLRQ
for policy development. If, on the other hand (as proves to be the case), we reject that 
hypothesis because there are significant variations across countries ± i.e. situated messiness ± 
WKHQZHERWKFKDOOHQJHWKHXWLOLW\RI5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶VSROLF\SUHVFULSWLRQDQGRSHQXSD
field for research into why such geographical variation exists ± something about which we 
make initial observations only. Indeed, there is only so much that can be achieved with the 
extensive variable-based approach we adopt here, and this needs to be supplemented by 
intensive case-based approaches (della Porta, 2008) that follows the detailed history of 
country trajectories. We have however shown unambiguously that there are different relations 
that need to be explained.    
Varying relations between debt and growth 
That second message is the focus of the discussion here. Our key argument is that Reinhart 
and Rogoff, in their attempts to come to a cleaU DQG µFOHDQ¶ FRQFOXVLRQ ZLWK VWURQJ SROLF\
implications, failed to exploit the potential of their data (as was also the case with Herndon et 
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al., but in their case this was understandable because their paramount goal was to replicate 
5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶V findings). 
What Reinhart and Rogoff failed to explore (and which therefore Herndon et al. only touched 
on) was variation across the 20 countries.  Instead, their search for a single, simple conclusion 
meant that they did not consider the possibility that context might matter and things may vary 
by country.  Their aim ZDVµWREXLOGWKHFDVHIRU DVW\OLVHGIDFW¶ (Herndon et al., 2013, p. 2), a 
VLQJOHVWDWHPHQWVXFKDVµRQFHWKHGHEW*'3UDWLRH[FHHGVUHDOJURZWh will substantially 
GHFOLQH¶.  Such hard and fast rules are often critiqued, particularly by economic geographers 
who believe that space and context matter.  Clark (1998), for example, argued that a stylized 
fact is µcompromised by its reliance on a ready-made world¶S, a reliance which µstrips 
bare the complexity of life... stylized facts threaten the hard won work of the past twenty 
years aimed at integrating spatial heterogeneity into the theoretical core of economic 
geography¶ S Indeed, returning to the case of growth and debt, it may well be, for 
example, that:  
x countries differ in their average GDP growth rates, whatever their debt levels, because 
of (possibly unique or at least particular to some countries only) characteristics that 
are outside the model; and 
x countries differ in the intensity of the response to changes in the debt:GDP ratio ± in 
some it may stimulate a steeper decline than others. 
That one or more of these situations may characterise the countries analysed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff for the 1947-2009 period is readily appreciated by three simple graphs generated from 
the corrected data set made available by Herndon et al. The first (Figure 1) uses the Reinhart-
Rogoff classification of country years into four groups according to the debt:GDP ratio. 
There is very substantiaOYDULDWLRQLQWKHUDWHRIUHDO*'3JURZWKDURXQGHDFKJURXS¶VPHDQ
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YDOXH VWURQJO\ VXJJHVWLYH RI IDFWRUV RWKHU WKDQ WKH VLQJOH µLQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH¶ ± the 
debt:GDP ratio ± influencing the national rate of growth. This is further reflected by the R-
squared value of just 4% found by Herndon et al. (2013, p. 22) in their regression of growth 
by these debt categories.  The second (Figure 2) ± VLPLODUWR+HUQGRQ¶HWDO¶V)LJXUHs 3 and 4 
± shows that not only is the relationship between the two variables minimal compared to the 
overall variation of the data, but that there is also no apparent evidence that the slope 
becomes steeper once the debt:GDP ratio exceeds 90. (There are few points where the 
debt:GDP ratio exceeds 100 and it is likely that such points have excessive leverage on any 
computed relationship.) Finally, Figure 3 shows 5HLQKDUW DQG 5RJRII¶V data for three 
countries only ± Japan, New Zealand and United States ± to illustrate our argument. For 
Japan, there is a general, although weak (given the wide scatter of points) negative 
relationship between the two variables; for New Zealand, there is if anything a positive 
relationship1 ± a high debt:GDP ratio is more likely to be associated with a high growth rate; 
and for the United States a steep negative relationship is very much a function of a single 
outlier (where the debt-to-growth ratio exceeds 100) only. 
[Figs. 2 and 3 about here] 
There are two reasons why consideration of this heterogeneity is important.  The first is 
technical: failure to do so can lead to spurious relationships and non-linearities (such as 
5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶Vthreshold) being estimated: 
                                                          
1
 The relationship for New Zealand would appear more strongly positive, were it not for two outliers.  It so 
happens that one of these points is for 1951, the year of the Waterfront Strike (Brooking, 2004, p. 135).  This 
point was the only one inclƵĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚĂƚĂƐĞƚĨŽƌEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚŝŶZĞŝŶŚĂƌƚĂŶĚZŽŐŽĨĨ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƉĂƉĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ
due to the weighting system used by Reinhart and Rogoff, this data point had a particularly strong influence on 
the apparent relationship found (Herndon, et al., 2013, p. 6), despite the low growth having very little to do 
with debt at all, and being unrepresentative of New Zealand in general. The need for detailed case analysis is 
clearly shown by this example. 
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The commonly found 90% debt threshold is likely to be the outcome of empirical 
misspecification ± a pooled instead of heterogeneous model ± and subsequently a 
misinterpretation of the results, whereby it is assumed that pooled model estimates ... 
imply that a common non-linearity detected apples within all countries over time. 
(Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2013, 24-25) 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, such heterogeneity is of genuine substantive interest, 
given that if it exists then SROLF\ GHYLVHG RQ WKH EDVLV RI DQ RYHUDOO VW\OLVHG IDFW ³PD\ EH
VHULRXVO\ PLVJXLGHG´ (Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2013, 24) in countries where that average 
rule does not apply. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to expect differences 
between countries. Reinhart et al. (2003) argue that countries have different levels of debt 
tolerance, which depend in particular on their inflation history and strength of their state and 
financial institutions (see also Kraay and Nehru, 2006, Manasse and Roubini, 2009).  Others 
have suggested that the effect of debt of growth depends either on its composition (Dell'Erba 
et al., 2013) or the specific production technologies in a given country (Eberhardt and 
Presbitero, 2013 p3, following Temple, 1999).  This argument is supported empirically.  In 
comparing potential tipping points across countries, Egert (2013) produces evidence for 
significant country specificity, finding only a few countries where there is any relationship at 
all; tipping points varied significantly both in the level of debt at which they occurred and the 
magnitude of the effect.  Eberhardt and Presbitero (2013) found similar evidence of between-
country heterogeneity, whilst Kourtellos et al. (2013) found that debt only affected growth in 
countries with undemocratic political regimes.  The presence of heterogeneity does not 
necessarily mean that there is not additionally an overall effect when that heterogeneity is 
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controlled out (e.g. see Chudik et al., 20132), but clearly there is strong theoretical and 
empirical evidence to suggest that the possibility of varying relations between debt and 
growth is justified. 
The question of reverse causality  
An additional potential critique concerns the question of reverse causality.  The associations 
found by Reinhart and Rogoff are used to suggest that debt levels have an impact on growth, 
but it is possible that that relationship operates, at least partly, in the other direction. There 
are certainly theoretical reasons for thinking that debt is likely to accumulate when growth is 
low (low growth means lower government revenue, meaning governments are forced into 
debt to maintain their welfare state and capital programmes).  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 
xxxii) seem well aware of this causal pathway when they observed in earlier work that: 
Banking crises almost invariably lead to sharp declines in tax revenues as well as 
significant increases in government spending... On average, government debt rises by 
86 percent during the three years following a banking crisis. 
Yet in the later papers critiqued here they make no mention that this reversed relationship 
could be the cause of their observed correlation. 
The possibility of such reverse causality is discussed by Dube (2013) in his reanalysis of 
Herndon et al.¶VGDWD +HDUJXHV WKDW WKHDSSDUHQWQRQ-linearity of the association (a steep 
slope at low levels of debt and a shallower slope at higher levels ± see Figure 2) is indicative 
of reverse causality, because one would expect steeper slopes to occur at high levels of debt 
because of tipping points.  This conclusion is confirmed by impulse responses from his 
                                                          
2
 Chudik et al. (2013) find ƚŚĂƚ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚĨŽƌŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĞƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďƚĐĂŶŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨĚĞďƚŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ? ? ? ) ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƚŚĂƚĂŶǇ
effĞĐƚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĨŝƐĐĂůƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĨŽƌĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞďƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞ ? 
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distributed lag models. Similarly, Irons and Bivens (2010) run Granger causality tests on data 
VLPLODU WR 5HLQKDUW DQG 5RJRII¶V ZKLFK KDGQ¶W EHHQ UHOHDVHG ZKHQ WKHir paper was 
published.)  Under a variety of numbers of lags, they find no evidence that debW µ*UDQJHU-
causes¶JURZWK,3 but there is evidence at all lags considered that growth Granger-causes debt. 
Elsewhere, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) note the possibility of low growth (particularly in 
economic crises) leading to high debt, raising a question whether the association is bi-
directional or whether all or most of it can be accounted for by a causal pathway from low 
growth to high debt.  They argue from specific examples that the effect promoted as their 
µVW\OLVHGIDFW¶ operates, at least in part, with debt having an impact on growth; thus high debt 
over a long period was seen as a key factor in *UHHFH¶s economic trouble in the late 2000s 
and early 2010s.  Whilst a number of papers (Cecchetti et al., 2011, Checherita-Westphal and 
Rother, 2012, Furceri and Zdzienicka, 2012, Kumar and Woo, 2010) have used methods to 
control for reverse causality, and still find an apparent effect going from high debt to low 
growth, others find no such effect once reverse causality is properly accounted for(Panizza 
and Presbitero, 2012). Whilst these methods for dealing with reverse causality all have their 
flaws,4 they raise the important point that the existence of some reverse causality does not 
mean that there could not be an effect in the original direction as well.  The complexity of the 
possible causal pathways is explicated by the flow diagram of Figure 4.  To justify the view 
that debt has a negative effect on growth, one must believe that the arrows pointing from debt 
towards growth are more substantively important than those going from growth to debt.  
                                                          
3
 Granger causality can be defined as when an unusual spike in X leads to a later spike in Y, tested using an 
autoregressive model including lagged values of both Y and X (Granger, 1969).  Whilst this does not confirm 
causality (both increases could have been caused by a third omitted factor), it is indicative of it. 
4
 Whilst many of the models that are used have their uses, none are without their flaws and no model can 
definitively prove causality or lack thereof.  For example the use of instrumental variables (for example the 
General Method of Moments estimator) to address the endogeneity present in the model leads to only a small 
amount of the variance in the model being analysed, reducing both the statistical power of the model and the 
real world heterogeneity that we are often interested in (Deaton, 2010).  Indeed, Panizza and Presbitero 
(2013) argue that these methods are unsuitable for datasets with relatively few cross-sectional units and so do 
not appropriately control for such reverse causality 
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However, as Dube (2013) points out, there is another, structural, reason for this reverse 
causality; the debt:GDP ratio includes GDP, so any growth will automatically reduce this 
ratio (and vice-versa). 
[Figure 4 about here] 
What none of these papers consider, however, is the potential heterogeneity in the extent of 
this reverse causality across time and space (periods and countries).  Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010b) may have found something interesting that occurred in Greece, but that does not 
necessarily imply that their stylized fact ± that high debt leads to low growth ± can be 
extended to a global rule.  Similarly, those papers which find a bi-directional effect do not 
consider how these effects might vary from place to place. 
Methodology 
7KLV SDSHU¶V VXEVWDQWLYH FRQWULEXWLRQ FRPes in two parts.  The first ignores the issue of 
reverse causality and considers only how the association between debt and growth varies 
across countries. It deploys statistical methods which allow for a robust analysis of 
heterogeneity whilst maintaining some capacity to generalise where such generalisation is 
required or justified: multilevel models are perfectly suited for this purpose.  The second part 
addresses the issue of reverse causality, and considers how that might itself vary between 
countries.  ,QERWKFDVHVZHXVHG5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶VGDWDPDGHDYDLODEOHE\+HUQGRQHW
al. (2013). 
Varying relations 
The dataset used by Reinhart and Rogoff and Herndon et al. is hierarchically constructed: it 
comprises years as measurement occasions nested within countries and so can readily be 
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analysed using multi-level modelling methods. These have characteristics that take into 
account major technical considerations regarding the data such as dependency within 
countries; data points within a country are more dependent on each other than occasions in 
different countries, making the assumption of homoscedasticity of standard linear regression 
modelling implausible. 
Multilevel models account for differences between groups by partitioning variance between 
these hierarchical levels, so that dependence within groups is explicitly modelled.  Moreover, 
the effects of variables can have their own variance such that slopes can be of different 
magnitudes for different groups of observations (countries in this case); these different 
PDJQLWXGHVDUHVKUXQNWRZDUGVDFRPPRQPHDQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHUHOLDELOLW\RIWKDWFRXQWU\¶V
estimate, making the results very robust (Snijders and Bosker, 2012, p.62).  Additionally, the 
variance at the lowest level can be modelled as a function of FRYDULDWHV7KXVµWKHVSHFLILFV
RISHRSOH DQGSODFHV DUH UHWDLQHG LQ DPRGHOZKLFK VWLOO KDV D FDSDFLW\ IRU JHQHUDOLVDWLRQ¶
(Jones, 2005, p.255). 
A simple version of our model is thus as follows: 
ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴௝ ൅ ߚଵ௝ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ ൅ ݁଴௜௝൅݁ଵ௜௝ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ 
ߚ଴௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ݑ଴௝ 
ߚଵ௝ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ݑଵ௝ 
These equations ± one at the micro (occasion) level and the other two at the macro (country) 
level ± combine to form: 
ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ ൅ ሾݑ଴௝ ൅ ݑଵ௝ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ ൅ ݁଴௜௝൅݁ଵ௜௝ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ሿ 
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Where ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௝ is the year per cent change in real GDP, and ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ is the debt to GDP ratio 
of country j in year i.  The ߚ଴ term is the average intercept, which differs for countries by ݑ଴௝, 
and ߚଵ is the average effect of the debt:GDP ratio, which differs across countries by ݑଵ௝.  At 
level 1, the variance is allowed to vary as a function of debt, via the additional residual term ݁ଵ௜௝.  This is both substantively interesting and technically important so as to avoid variance 
being assigned to the higher level erroneously (Rasbash et al., 2009).  At both level 1 and 2, 
these variances are assumed to be bivariate Normal, with the intercept variance, slope 
variance and covariance at both levels estimated from the data, such that: 
ቂݑ଴௝ݑଵ௝ቃ  ?ܰ ቆ ?ǡ ቈߪ௨଴ଶߪ௨଴௨ଵ ߪ௨ଵଶ ቉ቇ ቂ݁଴௝݁ଵ௝ቃ  ?ܰ ቆ ?ǡ ቈߪ௘଴ଶߪ௘଴௘ଵ ߪ௘ଵଶ ቉ቇ 
In our models, within and between effects were modelled as separate effects, which were 
allowed to differ by including the country mean of debt (Bell and Jones, 2014a).  This 
negates the need to perform a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) often used to justify the use of 
fixed effects models instead of the multilevel models used here.  The model is thus elaborated 
to become: 
ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ െ ܦܾ݁ݐതതതതതതത௝ሻ ൅ ߚଶܦܾ݁ݐതതതതതതത௝ ൅ ሾݑ଴௝ ൅ ݑଵ௝ሺܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ െ ܦܾ݁ݐതതതതതതത௝ሻ൅ ݁଴௜௝ ൅݁ଵ௜௝ሺܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ െ ܦܾ݁ݐതതതതതതത௝ሻሿ 
Where ߚଵ is the within (longitudinal) effect, and ߚଶ the between (cross-sectional) effect, of 
debt.  Whilst this within-between separation led to an improvement in the fit of some of the 
models analysed here, according to the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC, see 
Spiegelhalter et al., 2002), it did not change any of the substantive conclusions. 
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A number of questions are raised regarding how best to formulate such a model; what form 
might the relationship take?  Looking at the raw data suggests that there may be non-
linearities, with the relationship being strongest at low levels of debt (see Figures 2 and 3).  
Rather than analyse the µUDZ¶ GDWD, Reinhart and Rogoff collapsed the debt:GDP ratio 
variable into just four categories ± country:years with ratios of: less than 30, between 30 and 
59, between 60 and 89, and 90 or more. (We assume that the boundaries were determined 
after empirical explorations since no theoretical rationale was offered for them ± nor can one 
EHUHDGLO\FRQVWUXFWHGWKDWWKHµGHEWEXUGHQFOLII¶FDPHDWDUDWLRRIZDVDQRXWFRPHRIWKH
chosen classification.)  However, LIZHEHOLHYH5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶VLPSOLFDWLRQWKDWWKHUH
is a threshold of 90 per cent debt beyond which growth should decline, it would again make 
sense to model the debt variable in a non-linear way.  Thus, we consider both models which 
allow for quadratic functions of debt on growth, and others which include a dummy variable 
for country-years with debt ratios exceeding 90, alongside Reinhart and Rogoff¶Vother three 
categories, instead of a linear trend. 
A further question is whether to include a time trend in the models.  Reinhart and Rogoff do 
not, and thus effectively only consider the raw association between the two variables.  
However, it could be that the association is in part the result of long-run changes over time, in 
debt ratios, growth rates, or both, which are not related to the growth-debt causal pathway.  
We also want to test whether that trend is global, across all countries, or more local, varying 
between countries ± if the latter occurs, then those local trends need to themselves be 
FRQWUROOHGIRU7KLVLVGRQHE\FRPSDULQJWKHPRGHO¶VILWZKHUHWKH\HDUHIIHFWLVDDssumed 
fixed across all countries, and (b) allowed to vary between countries.  Again, the linearity of 
this effect needs to be tested by the inclusion of polynomial terms, and the combined model 
becomes (assuming all effects are linear and local time trends are being modelled): 
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ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ െ ܦܾ݁ݐതതതതതതത௝ሻ ൅ ߚଶܦܾ݁ݐതതതതതതത௝ ൅ ߚସܻ݁ܽݎ௜௝൅ ൣݑ଴௝ ൅ ݑଵ௝ሺܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ െ ܦܾ݁ݐതതതതതതത௝൯ ൅ ݑଶ௝ሺܻ݁ܽݎ௜௝ሻ ൅ ݁଴௜௝൅݁ଵ௜௝ሺܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ െ ܦܾ݁ݐതതതതതതത௝ሻ൅ ݁ଶ௜௝ሺܻ݁ܽݎ௜௝ሻሿ 
This formulation enables an assessment of the effect of debt levels on growth, controlling for 
any exogenous trends that may be affecting the growth variable over time.  The raw data 
suggest that there was a general decline in growth over time (see Figure 5a), which would be 
accounted for by this term, leaving any additional effect of debt over this to be determined.  
We report results of our models both with and without the year term included, so that the 
latter can be compared to Reinhart DQG5RJRII¶VILQGLQJV. 
We fitted the following multilevel models: 
1. A model with just linear (within and between) covariates for debt, with the variance 
partitioned between countries and occasions (random intercepts model); 
2. As model 1, but with the within effect allowed to vary at both levels 1 and 2; 
3. As model 2, but with a linear year term included in the fixed part; 
4. As model 3, but with the year term allowed to vary at both levels; 
5. A model with dummy terms for each of the categories used by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(random intercepts model) 
6. As model 5, but with the effect of each dummy variable allowed to vary at both levels 
1 and 2;  
7. As model 6, but with a linear year term included in the fixed part of the model 
8. As model 7, but with the year term allowed to vary at both years. 
We additionally tested for the significance of a quadratic fixed part term for both the year and 
the debt term, but these were found to be statistically insignificant. 
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All models were fitted using MLwiN version 2.27 (Rasbash et al., 2013) using Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain (MCMC) Gibbs sampling methods with non-informative priors defined by 
Iterative Generalised Least Squared (IGLS) maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of the same 
models, where possible (Browne, 2009).5   MCMC methods are superior to standard ML 
estimation when there is a small number of groups into which the observations are nested 
(Bell and Jones, 2014b, Stegmueller, 2013)6LQFH5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶VGDWDLQFOXGHMXVW
countries, we can expect an improvement in the accuracy of both point estimates and 
standard errors from using MCMC rather than ML estimation.  We ran the MCMC runs for 
20,000 iterations, plus a 1,000 iteration discarded initial burn-in, which was sufficient to 
achieve a reasonable effective sample size without any trending in the chains (assessed by 
visual inspection). 
Tests of reverse causality 
So far we have assumed that high debt is a cause of low growth, and not the other way 
around.  However, as Figure 4 shows, this assumption is not necessarily appropriate.  Indeed, 
one would expect low levels of growth to force the government to spend more in an attempt 
to stimulate the economy, as well as needing debt to fund existing public expenditure with 
reduced revenue from taxes.  The question is to what extent the relationships that we have 
found are the result of debt causing growth, and what extent they are the result of the opposite 
causal effect. 
In order to do this, we use a distributed lag model, which assesses the effect of a supposed 
increase in debt on growth.  If debt in general causes growth, we would expect to see the rise 
in debt occurring before a rise in growth.  Conversely, if it were more often the case that 
                                                          
5
 For some of the more complex models, it was not possible to fit the models using ML or restricted ML.  In 
these cases, plausible values were used as non-informative priors, obtained from MCMC estimates of similar 
but simpler models. 
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growth causes debt, we would expect to find the rise in debt occurring after the rise in 
growth.  Dube (2013) XVHVDGLVWULEXWHGODJPRGHOLQWKLVZD\XVLQJ5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶V
data, and finds that the effects of lags on debt were smaller than the effects of leads.  In other 
words, a supposed increase in debt seems to have an effect on growth in the past, but not 
growth in the future.  This is not logical, and suggests that primarily it is growth that is 
causing debt and not the other way around. 
'XEH¶VPRGHODVVXPHGKRZHYHUWKDWWKHFDXVDOGLUHFWLRQZDVFRQVLVWHQWDFURVVFRXQWULHV,W
may be that in some countries the effect of growth on debt is much greater than the effect of 
debt on growth (for example due to the nature of their financial institutions).  We have 
therefore developed a multilevel version of the distributed lag model.  This is a two-level 
model (occasions nested in countries); the first differences of three lags, the raw variable and 
three leads of debt are included in the model, and these effects are allowed to vary at level 2.6 
The model is thus specified as follows: 
ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺܦܾ݁ݐ௜ିଷ௝ሻ ൅ ߚଶሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ିଶ௝ሻ ൅ ߚଷሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ିଵ௝ሻ ൅ ߚସሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ሻ൅ ߚହሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ାଵ௝ሻ ൅ ߚ଺ሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ାଶ௝ሻ ൅ ߚ଻ሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ାଷ௝ሻ ൅ ߚ଼ܻ݁ܽݎ௜௝ ൅ ሾݑ଴௝൅ ݑଵ௝ሺܦܾ݁ݐ௜ିଷ௝ሻ ൅ ݑଶ௝ሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ିଶ௝ሻ ൅ ݑଷ௝ሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ିଵ௝ሻ ൅ ݑସ௝ሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜௝ሻ൅ ݑହ௝ሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ାଵ௝ሻ ൅ ݑ଺௝ሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ାଶ௝ሻ ൅ ݑ଻௝ሺ ?ܦܾ݁ݐ௜ାଷ௝ሻ ൅ ݑ଼௝ሺܻ݁ܽݎ௜௝ሻ൅ ݁଴௜௝ሿ 
ݑ଴௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨଴ଶ ሻǡ ݑଵ௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨ଵଶ ሻǡ ݑଶ௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨ଶଶ ሻǡ ݑଷ௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨ଷଶ ሻǡ ݑସ௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨ସଶ ሻǡݑହ௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨ହଶ ሻǡ ݑ଺௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨଺ଶ ሻǡ ݑ଻௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨଻ଶ ሻǡ ݑ଼௝  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨ଶ଼ ሻǡ ݁଴௜௝ ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪ௘଴ଶ ሻ. 
                                                          
6
 Due to the complexity of such models, it was not possible to fit them allowing for the effects to vary at level 
1.  It was also not possible to include covariances between the random effects for each of the lags.  More data 
would be required for such models to be feasible. 
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As with the previous models, this was estimated using MCMC estimation in MLwiN, run 
through Stata using the runmlwin command (Leckie and Charlton, 2013); the do-file for 
LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKLV FDQ EH IRXQG LQ WKLV DUWLFOH¶V RQOLQH DSSHQGL[  7KH PRGHO ZDV UXQ IRU
20000 iterations following a 2000 iteration burn-in, using IGLS estimates as starting values 
where possible.  We ran this model with and without a control included for year (although the 
results were broadly similar in either case, so here we only report the results where year is 
controlled in both the fixed and random parts of the model). 
Results  
Varying relations 
Figure 5 shows the relationships among the three variables in the dataset ± debt, growth and 
time ± across all countries in the sample.  Over time, growth is highly erratic (5a), compared 
to debt which changes much more slowly (5b).  This means that when using debt to explain 
growth, we will only be able to account for a small proportion of the variance in growth.  
Additionally, Figure 5c shows that the number of occasions when the debt:GDP ratio is over 
90 per cent is fairly limited, although there is some evidence of occasions where growth has 
been low in such situations, most notably in Japan, UK and Australia. 
[Fig. 5 (a-c) about here] 
Model 1 is the simplest model (apart from the null model 0) presented here, with only a linear 
effect of debt (both within and between) included in the model.  The parameter estimates (see 
Table 1) show that the average effect is significantly negative.  However, when (in model 2) 
the within effect of debt is allowed to vary between countries, variation between countries in 
the size of the effect emerges, as shown in Figure 6a.  Some countries have a significant 
downward trend, but others do not ± and some (for example New Zealand) have an apparent 
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positive trend.  The estimates suggest that countries such as the UK and Australia have had 
effectively no effect of debt on growth at all.  Certainly, Figure 6a provides little evidence for 
an overall rule ± such as ReinhaUWDQG5RJRII¶VµVW\OLVHGIDFW¶± that can be applied across the 
board. 
The story is somewhat different when time is controlled as a simple fixed effect in model 3.  
Here, the average within effect of debt is smaller than that in model 2 but appears to be more 
consistent across countries, whilst the estimated between-country variance in the slope is 
statistically insignificant (Figure 6b).  This is in line with Reinhart and Rogoff¶Vfindings and 
LPSOLHV WKDW WKH µVW\OLVHG IDFW¶ WKDW WKH\ DUJXH IRU PD\ EH valid ± there are no significant 
differences between countries in the size of the effect of debt when a global time trend is 
controlled for.  However we additionally tested to see if the variation in the data is better 
accounted for by local country trends by allowing the effect of year to vary.  Doing so 
improved the DIC significantly suggesting that there are indeed important differences in the 
RYHUDOOWUHQGRIFRXQWULHV¶JURZWKRYHUWLPH 
When the effect of Year was allowed to vary (model 4), the significance of the average effect 
of debt disappeared.  The increased homogeneity of the trends identified in model 3 was the 
result of controlling for a global time trend that was not representative of trends in growth in 
any individual country.  However, model 4 does show that the effect of debt is itself country 
dependent (Figure 6c).  Some countries (in particular Japan, Ireland and the US) appear to 
KDYH WUHQGVZKLFKDUH LQ OLQHZLWK5HLQKDUWDQG5RJRII¶VK\SRWKHVLV %XWRWKHUVDSSHDU WR
have effects that, if anything, operate in the opposite direction, and this includes Greece, cited 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) as a prime example where an increase in debt has caused a 
decrease in growth. 
[Fig. 6 (a-c) about here] 
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[Table 1 about here] 
Models 5-8 consider the situation when the debt variable is reduced to Reinhart and Rogoff¶V
four categories.  The results are broadly similar to those for models 1-4 (see Figure 7a-c and 
table 2).  Controlling for year as a fixed effect reduces the size of the mean effect, but those 
effects remain significant, particularly for the over-90 per cent debt category.  However when 
the year effect is allowed to vary, the effects of all debt categories become statistically 
insignificant. 
[Fig. 7 (a-c) about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
An additional finding of these models is in the variance of the level 1 residuals.  Figure 8 and 
9 show that, for both continuous and categorical debt, high levels of debt are associated with 
significantly more variance between occasions than the lower debt categories, a finding 
represented by a significant increase in the level 1 variance over time (the level 2 variance, in 
contrast is not found to be related to debt).  This suggests that the growth rate is more erratic 
when countries have a high level of debt ± some have very high and some very low growth 
years when experiencing a high debt level.   An example of this is New Zealand in 1951, 
when the Waterfront strike (Brooking, 2004, p. 135) brought the country into recession in a 
year that happened to also have high levels of debt.  Whilst this acted only to heavily skew 
the results found by Reinhart and Rogoff (Herndon et al., 2013, p. 6), here we are able to 
model it in a substantively interesting way whilst still being able to model general trends 
when they are present.  Highly erratic growth may still be considered undesirable (especially 
given that volatility could itself have a negative effect on growth ± see Ramey and Ramey 
1995), meaning that incurring high levels of debt would be considered unwise.  However, 
clearly the story remains rather more complex than that presented by Reinhart and Rogoff. 
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[Figs. 8 and 9 about here] 
Reverse Causality 
The results from our multilevel distributed lag model are shown as impulse responses, 
separately for each country, in Figure 10 (the parameter estimates are in Table 3).  Here, the 
horizontal axis represents the time before a supposed change in level of debt (with leads to 
the left of zero and lags to the right).  In general the biggest negative effects of debt on 
growth appear to be in the leads (on the left-hand sides of the graphs) rather than the lags.  
7KLVVXJJHVWVLQOLQHZLWK'XEH¶VILQGLQJVWKDWWKH negative relationships we found in 
the first part of our analysis are predominantly the result of the effect of growth on debt, 
rather than the effect of debt on growth.  What is new here is that this varies to some extent 
between countries.  In some (such as the United States) this pattern is very strong, suggesting 
an effect that is predominantly in the growth to debt direction; in others (such as Ireland) this 
is much less clear, suggesting that the direction of causation may be at least in part in the 
direction suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff.  Finally, in line with our previous results, in 
many countries (such as Norway and Canada) there is little evidence of any relationship 
between growth and debt at any lag or lead. 
[Fig. 10 about here] 
Whilst the purpose of this paper is mainly to reveal, rather than explain, the messiness in the 
relationship between growth and debt, it is worth at this point speculating as to possible 
causes of this heterogeneity.  A closer look at the data reveals that it is mainly the post-war 
years that are driving the big relationship found in the United States ± worth noting but hardly 
the basis for forming a causal understanding in typical macroeconomic scenarios.  In that 
case, the reverse causality is clear: high debts following the Second World War lead to a 
subsequent period of low growth.  In Japan, by contrast, the higher levels of debt are in recent 
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years (including the financial crisis).  However that the relationship in Japan does not hold 
when the period effect is controlled in the highest category (see Figure 7c) suggests that the 
rise of debt and the decline of growth are co-existent trends rather than there being a 
particular causal link.  Perhaps the best evidence for a causal effect of debt on growth comes 
from Ireland; however it is noteworthy that it is alone amongst European Union countries in 
experiencing this negative relationship, with most showing if anything a positive relationship 
between growth and debt when time is fully controlled (Figure 6c).  This suggests that 
membership to the EU could provide a cushion to any effect that debt may have on growth 
(or, vice versa).  A number of countries such as Canada appear to have little relation between 
growth and debt, perhaps because of the importance of the primary sector in its economy 
(which could be less susceptible to debt uncertainty than other sectors). 
Conclusions 
This paper has made two key points.  The first is that there is variation in the relationship 
between debt and GDP across countries.  There have been significant differences both 
between and within countries which make it clear that the association between debt and 
growth is more complex than Reinhart and Rogoff¶V stylised fact and, when a time trend is 
appropriately controlled for, any average effect of debt on growth becomes insignificant.  
This conclusion is both substantively important to the study of the relationship and its policy 
implications and methodologically important for all researchers considering hierarchically 
nested data.  Substantively these findings clearly indicate that, with regards to the effect of 
debt on growth, an argument and implied policy prescription based on DµVW\OLVHGIDFW¶ alone 
is much too simplistic and general to be particularly relevant from a policy perspective.  
Methodologically, we argue that testing how effects vary with context as we have here should 
25 
 
be as routine as testing other statistical modelling assumptions, across economics and the 
social sciences. 
The second point is that, whilst the relationship between debt and growth may appear 
significant in some modelling scenarios, evidence from our multilevel distributed lag model 
suggests that for most countries the direction of causation is predominantly in the opposite 
direction to that mooted by Reinhart and Rogoff.  However this too is subject to variation 
between countries with some, such as Ireland, exhibiting a less clear causal direction. 
The analyses reported here are somewhat limited by the small size of the dataset (both in 
terms of sample size and lack of potential control variables) and the weakness of the observed 
effects (in terms of the proportion of the variance explained).  It is difficult to estimate such 
complex models with minimal data, which may account for some of the reported statistically 
insignificant results.  But the nature of our conclusions remains substantively important: the 
relationship between debt and growth varies across countries and has limited explanatory 
power, with debt accounting for only a very small proportion of the variance at both levels.  
As such, the importance of debt for budgetary policies should not be exaggerated; much 
depends on time and place. 
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Figure 1: The relationship between debt and economic growth, using the corrected Reinhart-Rogoff 
data, with values on the X-axis grouped into four groups (<30; 30-59; 60-89; 90<).  A linear 
regression line between the two variables is also shown. 
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Figure 2: (a) Raw data of debt against growth, with a fitted smoothed line, and (b) the same smoothed 
line without the raw data.  The model was fit with a Generalised Additive Model using the mgcv 
package in R (Wood, 2006).  Dotted lines are 95% confidence bounds.  These figures replicate figures 
3 and 4 in Herndon et al (2013). 
 
 
Figure 3. The relationship between the debt:GDP ratio and the real rate of GDP growth in Japan, New 
Zealand and the United States. 
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Figure 4: flow diagram of possible causal pathways between growth and debt.  Based on Reinhart and Rogoff 2011 and Irons and Biven 2010. 
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Figure 5: Graphs showing the relationships between debt, growth and time (raw data). (a) How 
growth varies over time for each country; (b) how debt varies over time, for each country; (c) the 
relationship between debt and growth. 
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Figure 6a - Predicted growth as a function of (continuous) debt, from model 2, where Year is 
uncontrolled.  Notable countries are highlighted 
 
Figure 6b - Predicted growth as a function of (continuous) debt, from model 3, where Year is 
controlled in the fixed part of the model only.  Notable countries are highlighted 
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Figure 6c - Predicted growth as a function of (continuous) debt, from model 4, where Year is 
controlled in both the fixed and the random parts of the model.  Notable countries are highlighted.  
Panel 2 shows EU countries only. 
 
 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
Ireland 
UK 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 70 140 210 
Debt:GDP ratio 
Australia 
Greece 
Ireland 
Japan 
UK 
US 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 70 140 210 
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 G
ro
w
th
 (%
G
DP
) 
Debt:GDP ratio 
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 G
ro
w
th
 (%
G
DP
) 
35 
 
Figure 7a - Predicted growth as a function of (categorical) debt from model 6, where Year is 
uncontrolled.  Notable countries are highlighted 
Figure 7b Predicted growth as a function of (categorical) debt from model 7, where Year is controlled 
in both the fixed part of the model only.  Notable countries are highlighted 
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Figure 7c - Predicted growth as a function of (categorical) debt from model 8, where Year is 
controlled in both the fixed and random parts of the model.  Notable countries are highlighted.  Panel 
2 shows EU countries only. 
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Figure 8 Variance Functions, from model 3, at level 1.  With 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
Figure 9 - Variance functions, from model 7, at level 1. With 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 10: Impulse response graphs for each country from the multilevel distributed lag model.  With 
95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 1: Parameter estimates from models 1-4 (debt treated as continuous). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Ǻ S.E. ȕ S.E. ȕ S.E. ȕ S.E. 
Fixed Part 
        Constant 3.413 0.110 3.410 0.116 3.413 0.117 3.448 0.149 
Debt:GDP ratio (within) -0.021 0.003 -0.021 0.009 -0.013 0.005 0.004 0.007 
Debt:GDP ratio (between) -0.012 0.006 -0.011 0.007 -0.012 0.007 -0.010 0.009 
Year 
    
-0.055 0.005 -0.062 0.013 
         Random Part 
        Country Level 
        ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Cons) 0.097 0.094 0.141 0.084 0.146 0.077 0.310 0.145 ߪ௨଴௨ଵ 
  
-0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.005 ߪ௨ଵଶ  (within Debt) 
 
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 ߪ௨଴௨ଶ 
      
0.000 0.010 ߪ௨ଵ௨ଶ 
      
-0.001 0.001 ߪ௨ଶଶ  (Year) 
      
0.003 0.001 
 
        Occasion Level 
        ߪ௘଴ଶ  (Cons) 8.533 0.354 7.531 0.381 6.78 0.348 4.194 0.318 ߪ௘଴௘ଵ 
  
0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.017 0.007 ߪ௘ଵଶ  (within Debt) 
 
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 ߪ௘଴௘ଶ 
      
-0.042 0.012 ߪ௘ଵ௘ଶ 
      
-0.002 0.001 ߪ௘ଶଶ  (Year) 
      
0.007 0.001 
         DIC:  5864.093 5799.334 5703.751 5513.136 
NB ± all variables centred on their grand means 
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Table 2: Parameter estimates from models 5-8 (debt treated as categorical). 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model7 Model 8 
 
ȕ S.E. ȕ S.E. ȕ S.E. ȕ S.E. 
Fixed Part 
       Cons 4.194 0.16 4.121 0.303 3.899 0.28 3.575 0.281 
Debt (ref category is Cat 1, <30) 
   Cat 2 (30-60) -1.104 0.208 -1.053 0.412 -0.523 0.338 -0.076 0.371 
   Cat 3 (60-90) -1.04 0.264 -1.046 0.466 -0.697 0.437 -0.146 0.442 
   Cat 4 (90+) -2.085 0.333 -2.024 0.486 -2.117 0.709 -0.782 0.598 
Year 
   
-0.058 0.005 -0.058 0.012 
         Random Part 
       Country Level 
       ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Cons) 0.082 0.083 1.215 0.603 0.975 0.441 0.957 0.438 ߪ௨଴௨ଵ -1.427 0.748 -0.753 0.429 -0.807 0.473 ߪ௨ଵଶ  (Cat 2 Debt) 2.307 1.116 1.182 0.551 1.541 0.734 ߪ௨଴௨ଶ -1.645 0.866 -1.215 0.6 -1.165 0.602 ߪ௨ଵ௨ଶ 2.421 1.191 1.219 0.645 1.46 0.771 ߪ௨ଶଶ  (Cat 3 Debt) 2.822 1.506 2.17 1.034 2.181 1.034 ߪ௨଴௨ଷ -1.081 0.627 -0.633 0.662 -0.717 0.506 ߪ௨ଵ௨ଷ 1.528 0.812 0.494 0.707 0.75 0.649 ߪ௨ଶ௨ଷ 1.795 1.053 0.825 1 1.15 0.807 ߪ௨ଷଶ  (Cat 4 Debt) 1.252 0.895 3.011 2.031 1.844 1.161 ߪ௨଴௨ସ 
     
-0.006 0.015 ߪ௨ଵ௨ସ 
   
-0.002 0.021 ߪ௨ଶ௨ସ 
   
0.005 0.023 ߪ௨ଷ௨ସ 
   
-0.011 0.026 ߪ௨ସଶ  (Year) 
    
0.002 0.001 
      Occasion Level 
       ߪ௘଴ଶ  (Cons) 8.524 0.356 7.439 0.519 6.538 0.45 5.086 0.466 ߪ௘଴௘ଵ 0.342 0.373 0.451 0.336 -0.064 0.326 ߪ௘଴௘ଶ 0.009 0.459 0.222 0.415 -0.632 0.404 ߪ௘଴௘ଷ 2.734 0.941 2.801 0.953 0.194 0.702 ߪ௘ଵ௘ସ 
   
-0.035 0.037 ߪ௘ଶ௘ସ 
   
-0.033 0.04 ߪ௘ଷ௘ସ 
   
-0.088 0.039 ߪ௘଴௘ସ 
     
-0.033 0.032 ߪ௘ସଶ  (Year) 
    
0.007 0.001 
         DIC:  5863.298 5815.161 5709.028 5536.908 
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Table 3 ± Parameter estimates from the multilevel distributed lag models. 
 
Year uncontrolled 
 
Fixed Year 
controlled 
Fixed and random 
Year controlled 
 
ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE 
Fixed Part 
     Cons 4.671 0.307 75.689 9.888 70.667 10.509 
Debt t+3 -0.050 0.025 -0.030 0.025 -0.031 0.026 
Debt t+2 (differenced) -0.053 0.027 -0.046 0.026 -0.046 0.026 
Debt t+1 (differenced) -0.136 0.030 -0.128 0.029 -0.128 0.029 
Debt (differenced) -0.240 0.039 -0.230 0.038 -0.229 0.039 
Debt t-1 (differenced) 0.089 0.031 0.099 0.033 0.101 0.033 
Debt t-2 (differenced) -0.004 0.022 0.015 0.023 0.016 0.023 
Debt t-3 (differenced) -0.028 0.006 -0.018 0.006 -0.017 0.006 
Year 
  
-0.036 0.005 -0.032 0.006 
Random Part 
     Country Level 
     ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Cons) 1.313 0.626 0.694 0.352 6.933 22.560 ߪ௨଴ଶ   (Debt t+3) 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Debt t+2) 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Debt t+1) 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Debt) 0.020 0.011 0.020 0.010 0.020 0.011 
 ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Debt t-1) 0.010 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.012 0.007 ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Debt t-2) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Debt t-3) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ߪ௨଴ଶ  (Year) 
    
0.000 0.000 
Occasion Level 
     ߪ௘଴ଶ  (Cons) 4.146 0.193 4.009 0.189 3.984 0.187 
       DIC 4497.610 4460.760 4460.610 
 
 
